











In recent years, important segments of the
microfinance industry have demonstrated a
renewed interest in and commitment to
understanding how to effectively reach poor
people, assess their level of poverty, and judge the
performance of microfinance service providers.
However, for all of the public and, increasingly,
private money that flows to microfinance, there are
few models that provide guidance on reaching, and
making a positive impact on the lives of poor
people in a sustainable manner over an extended
period of time. In fact, remarkably few
microfinance organisations (MFOs) are capable of
even demonstrating how many of their clients are
poor and to what degree. As new tools for
evaluation and market analysis suggest, failure to
monitor and evaluate social outcomes can cut costs
in the short term at the expense of achieving long-
term social and economic objectives (Murdoch and
Haley 2002: 6).
In Central and Eastern Europe and the Newly
Independent States (CEE-NIS) – one of the youngest
regions for microfinance – this picture is affirmed in
the results of a recent survey undertaken on behalf
of the SEEP Network.1 The results of the survey echo
the state of the industry more broadly, with the
majority of the 41 institutions responding that they
do not have any holistic approach to poverty
assessment. Nor do any use proxy indicators that
provide reliable information on poverty outreach
that would indicate to the institutions and their
external stakeholders that they are reaching their
mission-defined target group. In fact, only half of the
organisations even attempt to measure the poverty
level of their clients and those that do use only direct
economic measures (MFC/SEEP 2003: 2–3).2 The
survey indicates that practitioners themselves wish
to identify indirect means to measure their clients’
poverty status in order to satisfy internal
stakeholders and understand their depth of
outreach. Commensurate with the need to measure
clients’ poverty status is that of enhancing social
performance, including depth and breadth of
outreach and impact. This article outlines some
steps that theMFO Prizma has taken to enhance and
sustain social performance by institutionalising
organisational learning and deepening outreach to
the poor in the culturally specific context of Bosnia
and Herzegovina.IDS Bulletin Vol 34 No 4 2003
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1.1 The context of Bosnia and
Herzegovina
Out of a pre-war population of 4.4 million, the war
in the early to mid-1990s left 250,000 people dead
or missing, and over 50 per cent of the population
displaced. Significant displacement and the
destruction of housing and production facilities led
to a dramatic reduction in living standards and an
equally dramatic increase in poverty (Chong and
Bosogno 2002: 63). The devastation that war
brought meant that Bosnia and Herzegovina’s loss of
gross domestic product (GDP) exceeded that of any
other transition country, even those that had also
suffered war during their transition (ibid). Despite
an estimated 23 per cent loss of the population as a
result of death and migration, per capita GDP
dropped from US$2,000 in 1990 to an estimated
US$500 in 1995 (World Bank 1999: vi; 48).
In response to Bosnia’s severe condition more than
$5 billion was invested in the five years following the
end of the war (OHR 2000) with little or no formal
assessment of actual need. However, donor funding
is clearly diminishing in Bosnia and Herzegovina as
other areas of the Balkans and other corners of the
world capture attention. At the same time, there are
estimated to be 42 registered financial service
organisations in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Dunn and
Tvrtkovic 2003: 10). In a country of an estimated
3.5 million people, this has translated into the most
competitive microfinance environment in the region
and one of the more competitive environments in
the world. It is in this context that financial self-
sufficiency has become absolutely imperative,
especially for those MFOs not selected for long-
term, subsidised funding under the World Bank’s
Local Initiatives Programme (LIP).
1.2 Prizma overview
Founded in 1997 by an international non-
governmental organisation3 and registered locally
in 2001, Prizma is still a relatively young
institution with a great deal to learn and capacity to
grow.4 Prizma’s vision is to provide people with
choices to improve their lives; its mission is to
improve the well-being of poor and low-income
women and their families, by providing long-term
access to quality financial and non-financial
services. The fully localised institution now serves
roughly 10,000 active clients from five
decentralised branch offices and more than 30
satellite offices across the country. In 2001, Prizma
achieved full financial self-sufficiency, generating
an annual surplus of more than $100,000.
Prizma’s steps to strengthen social performance,
increase its internal and external accountability for
depth of outreach and impact, and position itself
strategically to remain effective in an increasingly
competitive environment, have been based
fundamentally on board and management analysis
of the context and needs of poor people in Bosnia
and Herzegovina. In addition, there is an
increasing body of research that demonstrates the
potential, diversity, and flexibility of microfinance
service providers to achieve social impact while
strengthening their institutional viability. Among
important recent findings are the following:
n Microfinance can help reduce extreme poverty
more than moderate poverty (Khandker 2003:
21);
n MFOs do not necessarily face a trade-off
between sustainability and outreach (Barrès
2003: 29); 
n Institutions can become self-sufficient, reaching
a poor clientele with productivity and efficiency
gains based on solid credit methodology,
streamlined operations, an effective
management information system (MIS), and
skilled staff (Nègre and Maguire 2003: 17); 
n Microfinance can be effective for a broad range
of clients, including the very poor – those
living in the bottom half of those below a
country’s poverty line; 
n Excellent financial performance does not
preclude strong outreach to poor households; 
n Reaching the poor is not at odds with
maintaining excellent financial performance
and professional business practices; and
n Organisations that seek to address poverty and
vulnerability as an explicit goal and make it a
part of their organisational culture are far more
effective at reaching poor households than
those that prioritise financial performance
(Murdoch and Haley 2002: 6–7).
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Since its inception, Prizma has embraced social
performance and financial sustainability as core
values, which has led to constant clarification of
the essential indicators of its effectiveness as a
social enterprise. In fact, the premise of Prizma’s
work under Imp-Act is that social and institutional
performance are mutually enforcing goals. Within
this principal framework, Prizma has focused on
three critical objectives:
n Measuring and deepening outreach in an
environment of poverty and growing inequality; 
n Improving service quality and institutional
performance in an environment of growing
competition; and
n Measuring and improving social impact. To
these ends, the organisation has sought to
enhance social performance by
institutionalising organisational learning and
deepening poverty outreach, focusing
fundamentally on leadership, organisational
culture, incentives, and systems.
2. Institutionalising organisational
learning
2.1 Understanding poverty in Bosnia
and Herzegovina
As the outline of poverty and vulnerability at the
beginning of this article indicates, there is still
much to learn about the extent, nature, and
severity of poverty and vulnerability in Bosnia and
Herzegovina. Employing qualitative and
quantitative research methods and drawing on
available external research, Prizma has sought to
better understand who is poor in this post-war and
transitional setting and to what extent the
organisation is reaching these people. Additionally,
Prizma has sought to identify and mitigate biases
that lead to exclusion of the poor.
2.1.2 Internal research
First, Prizma is mining rich existing information
from its MIS, to better understand seasonality, risk,
and other salient features of poorer segments of its
clientele. Second, the organisation has worked with
staff of the Microfinance Centre for Eastern Europe
and Newly Independent States (MFC) to adapt
participatory rapid appraisal (PRA) tools, used for
many years in the developing world and recently
adapted to microfinance by MicroSave-Africa,5 to
the culturally specific context of Bosnia and
Herzegovina. Employing these adapted tools,
Prizma has sought to better understand the
multidimensional nature, complexity and
dynamism of poverty; the daily challenges and
vulnerability that people face; client, non-client,
and staff perceptions of the poor; and the
landscape for financial services more generally.
Third, with financial support from the Consultative
Group to Assist the Poorest (CGAP)6 and the Ford
Foundation-funded Imp-Act programme, Prizma
contracted an independent research firm in 2002
to carry out a poverty assessment to assess the
poverty level of clients relative to non-clients, and
a national omnibus survey, incorporating the
questions from the poverty assessment, to assess
poverty more generally across the country. In
addition to contributing to Prizma’s understanding
of the character of poverty, this research – the first
of its kind in the region – highlighted areas of the
country where poverty is most prevalent and, thus,
ways in which Prizma can strengthen its targeting
and outreach. Additionally, it has provided Prizma
with valuable information on which its
organisational learning, poverty assessment, and
impact monitoring work is progressing.
Among other findings, Prizma’s research indicated
that:
n Sixty-four per cent of new clients are among
the poorest and moderately poor terciles in
every community in which it provides service;7
n Poverty is particularly prevalent among ethnic
minorities, returnees and refugees, women,
people in rural areas generally, and in many
communities of the Federation and virtually all
communities of the Serb Republic; 
n The character of poverty in the country is
complex, encompassing an educated “new
poor” who may have a significant asset base but
limited and intermittent income, as well as a
more “traditional” poor who have few assets
and little or no education, and limited and
intermittent income; 
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n While some regions of the country have a
greater concentration of poor people, there are
dramatic differences in poverty among regions
and within each region due to the ethnic and
rural character of poverty; and
n Shelter, an asset that has proven a critical
indicator of poverty in the developing world, is
only modestly correlated with poverty among
the ‘new poor’ – those with an important asset
base but limited and intermittent income.
2.1.3 External research
Complimenting its internal or contracted research,
Prizma has drawn on recently completed Living
Standards Measurement Survey (LSMS), United
Nations Development Programme (UNDP), and other
data, to correlate non-economic proxies for its clients’
poverty status identified through the GCAP poverty
assessment and omnibus research. Among the
important findings, recent research concludes that
27.3 per cent of the population is considered poor
and 11.5 per cent can be considered extremely poor
(Chong and Bosogno 2002: 64), but as indicated in
the omnibus survey, significant variations exist within
each region and among regions across the country.
For example, Chong and Bosogno report that in the
Republika Srpska – one of the two legal entities that
comprise Bosnia and Herzegovina – 51.9 per cent of
the population is below the general poverty line and
21.5 per cent of the population is living in extreme
poverty (2002: 64). Additionally, only 20 per cent of
the poor live in urban municipalities, indicating that
poverty is concentrated predominantly in small
communities – villages and towns – across the
country (World Bank 2002: 30). Sadly, ethnic
cleansing appears to have succeeded, directly or more
likely indirectly, in isolating ethnic groups from one
another in significant pockets of poverty (Chong and
Bosogno 2002: 69). Importantly, individuals
employed in state-owned firms, socially owned
enterprises, and government face higher risk of being
poor than those employed in the private sector or self-
employed in microenterprise, following similar
findings in other transitioning countries. In fact, the
private sector has the lowest poverty and extreme
poverty risk (ibid). Meanwhile, inequality has
deteriorated since the end of the war, with 50 per cent
of the population receiving just 20 per cent of the total
income (ibid) – a particularly striking development
given Bosnia and Herzegovina’s relatively egalitarian
pre-war societal structure.8
2.2 Understanding exclusion
Drawing on Simanowitz’s analysis of exclusion
(2002: 1–2), Prizma has identified areas and means
by which poor people have been left behind
through informal and formal exclusion.
Understanding exclusion has been central to
Prizma’s organisational learning, leading it to re-
evaluate aspects of its operations and re-engineer
its performance management system, including
incentives, to deepen and broaden outreach.
2.2.1 Informal exclusion by the
organisation
Prizma has identified and taken steps to address
informal exclusion – one of the most significant
areas that cause poor people to be left behind.
n Through ongoing focus group and drop-out
research, and regular feedback from field staff,
management has sought to better understand
clients and non-clients’ perceptions of the
organisation, to ensure poor people find
affinity with its image, public projection, and
staff approach. Understanding poor people’s
perceptions has also been critical to Prizma’s
efforts to monitor and clarify its strategic
position and identify market opportunities in
an increasingly competitive environment.9
n Through regular market research Prizma has
identified ways in which products, policies,
and procedures have contributed to informal
exclusion of poor people.
n Branch managers have undertaken focus group
research with non-management staff to
understand and develop strategies to mitigate
staff bias towards poor people.
n Prizma is piloting new means of delivering
service to poor people in rural areas, leveraging
organisational infrastructure and capacity, and
community networks and trust.
n Given that many solidarity groups are formed
along income and ethnic lines, and the
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exclusionary dynamic this represents for poor
and very poor people who are less influential in
forming or joining groups of less or non-poor
members in small communities, the
organisation is facilitating group formation by
poorer members.
n Prizma has taken steps to simplify paperwork,
minimise eligibility requirements, and shift
tasks requiring literacy and numeracy from
applicants to trained field staff.
n Finally, Prizma has re-assessed its approach to
repayment delinquency – one of the most
important areas of informal exclusion among
lending organisations – based on knowledge
that poor and vulnerable people often face
family and business crises, intermittent pension,
salary or remittance payments, or otherwise
struggle to maintain smooth income flows that
allow them to provide for their family’s and their
basic needs. Though branch managers have full
autonomy to approve renewal applications from
clients who have previously been delinquent for
understandable and compelling reasons
unrelated to willingness to repay, field staff bias
and Prizma’s previous loan officer incentive
programme had previously led loan officers to
screen out and exclude larger numbers of clients
with repayment difficulties, so that many poorer
applicants’ cases never made it to the credit
committee.
Recognising that minimising arrears is fundamental
to its long-term viability, Prizma has maintained
very strong portfolio quality since its inception.10
However, with experience it has also recognised
that portfolio quality, like financial self-sufficiency,
is a means to an end and something that can be
maintained through a combination of incentives,
disincentives, and delinquency management
approaches. Thus, following trend analysis using
historical data from its MIS and reflection on the
nature of credit risk in Bosnia and Herzegovina,
Prizma abandoned repayment rate altogether as a
measure of short-term portfolio quality and shifted
loan officers’ monthly bonus weighting for
portfolio at risk (PAR) from >1 to >30 days past
due. Given that repayment for all products is
monthly, this step has effectively freed branch
managers and loan officers from the pressure to
maintain zero portfolio at risk for arrears of 1–30
days. At the same time, branch managers have
emphasised stronger outreach to poor people,
analysis of poor clients’ circumstances when any
payment becomes one day past due, and sensitive
differentiation between clients’ ability and
willingness to repay.
This combination of steps has helped diminish a
long-standing tendency for loan officers to practise
zero tolerance for delinquency by screening out
and informally excluding clients who do not
contribute to perfect portfolio quality calculated at
one day past due and, in turn affect their monthly
incentive pay and professional standing in the
branch. Prizma’s portfolio quality has remained
very strong, but field staff now have somewhat
greater flexibility to understand and negotiate
repayment with those clients who occasionally
suffer a family crisis or other setback. Preliminary
evidence also suggests that greater flexibility
towards delinquency in the first 30 days of arrears
is helping reduce voluntary and non-voluntary
drop-out. Though flexibility towards delinquency
may seem heresy in some corners of the industry, it
is one of a number of areas Prizma has identified
opportunities to strengthen social and institutional
performance by increasing efficiency, reducing
drop-out generally, and better retaining those most
often left behind.
2.2.2 Formal exclusion by the
organisation
Prizma has also identified formal attributes of the
organisation and its service that have led to
exclusion of poorer people. By recognising that
some product attributes, such as high minimum
loan sizes or stringent collateral requirements,
discourage poorer applicants, Prizma has refined
product terms to better match poor people’s needs
and capacities. Prizma has researched, pilot-tested,
costed, and launched new products to meet a
broader array of needs of poorer segments of its
broad low-income clientele, including non-
enterprise needs such as small sums that help
clients smooth income flows. The organisation has
also affirmed ongoing support for start-up
enterprises, including those that require modest
inputs and limited risk. Branch offices approve the
large majority of all applications for start-up
38
3Kline  05/09/03  7:09 am Page 38
enterprises, and lack of collateral is rarely a deal-
breaker, provided a client can demonstrate some
knowledge of the risks and needs of the enterprise.
Finally, though Prizma remains a lending-only
organisation by law, ongoing research is helping
position the organisation to address poor people’s
critical non-credit needs at a point when the legal
environment allows it to engage in broader
activities.
2.2.3 Self-exclusion by clients
Self-exclusion is another area where Prizma has
taken steps to understand and mitigate bias.
Analysing historical delinquency data from the
organisation’s MIS and branch practices confirm
the degree to which group loan sizes grow over
time as a result of disbursement pressures and
explicit or implicit step lending. Though many
poor and low-income clients can and do absorb
larger loans over time as their capacity grows or
seasonality leads to periods of higher demand,
emphasis on automatic increases over time,
particularly within groups, can lead to poorer
clients’ self-exclusion. To understand this informal
bias Prizma has undertaken focus group research
with poorer clients and non-clients and, among
steps, introduced a new quick access individual
product with a modest collateral requirement, to
address poorer clients’ smaller, short-term needs,
and re-emphasised lending based primarily on
clients’ identified need rather than on automatic
increases.
2.2.4 Client exit
Finally, Prizma has taken important steps to
understand and address client exit, a phenomenon
that is costly to Prizma’s bottom line of achieving
sustainability and its effort to achieve sustained
social impact over time. These steps are:
n To understand who is leaving voluntarily and
why, Prizma tracks drop-out generally and
among poorer clients specifically.
n Prizma follows up on trends highlighted
through drop-out monitoring using exit
interviews and focus group discussions with
poor drop-outs, to explore causes of exit in
greater depth.
n Drawing on important learning from the Small
Enterprise Foundation (SEF) in South Africa,
and other organisations, Prizma now includes
drop-out in its loan officer and annual team
incentives,matched with strategies to help loan
officers and other front-line staff better retain
clients.11
n Prizma has re-evaluated the causes and costs of
forcing people out as a means to maintain very
high portfolio quality. A policy of zero-
tolerance was a prudent step to minimise credit
risk when Prizma was a young organisation in
a fast changing post-war environment in 1997.
However, with more experience, increasing
competition, and the desire to support clients’
longer-term needs and wants, Prizma now
recognises the financial, competitive, and social
costs of failing to be flexible and the need to
encourage greater service flexibility.12
3. Managing for social performance
3.1 Leadership
Leadership has proven critical to Prizma’s progress
on its social performance agenda, as senior and
middle managers have strengthened the
organisation’s pro-poor orientation and re-affirmed
the pro-poor mandate embedded in its mission.
The management has applied a poverty lens to all
formal documentation, adding to or revising where
there were opportunities to reframe Prizma’s
operations – methodology, policies, and
procedures – in terms of targeting, attracting,
serving, and retaining poor people. Also, while
senior management has led the organisation’s social
performance agenda, it has also sought to develop
and nurture middle and non-management
leadership on this agenda across Prizma,
recognising that any effort to deepen outreach,
improve service quality, and strengthen impact
must be broadly supported and implemented by
field staff engaged with poor people in
communities across the country.
3.2 Organisational culture
Organisational culture is fundamental to Prizma’s
historic and future social and institutional
performance, and senior management has taken
important steps to communicate and reshape the
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Figure 1: Team incentive balancing social and institutional objectives
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culture to balance developmental and institutional
objectives. The management has revised and
strengthened the recruitment and induction
process to ensure mission, vision, and
organisational values are central to every applicant
and employee’s introduction to and training within
Prizma. The management then affirms mission and
values on an ongoing basis via the organisation’s
intranet, memos, annual retreat, and regular office
visits. Also, it has been clear from Prizma’s
inception that communicating branch, product,
and organisation-wide performance results to staff
on a regular basis yields accountability for results
and strong consequent performance. Thus,
headquarters provide social, financial, and
portfolio performance reports to staff on a monthly
basis via the organisation’s intranet and regular
branch level meetings. The next section highlights
ways in which Prizma has integrated appraisals
with performance reporting in six core
performance areas, to tightly align incentives and
performance with its fundamental social and
institutional objectives.
3.3 Incentives
Perhaps one of the most important areas where
Prizma has taken steps to enhance and
institutionalise social performance has been in re-
engineering its performance management system –
appraisal, reward, and communication – to better
align employee interests and rewards with greater
depth of outreach, improved service quality, and
the financial health of the institution. On one level,
loan officers are rewarded monthly for performance
on a few select indicators,13 including those in four
of Prizma’s six core performance areas – depth,
breadth, drop-out, administrative efficiency,
productivity, and write-off. This monthly incentive
focuses on short-term social and institutional
performance. On a second level, each member of
each branch team receives a percentage of Prizma’s
annual surplus as a flat profit share based on their
team’s aggregate score across its six core
performance areas.14
Rather than a reward for short-term results, this
incentive affirms strong team performance towards
the organisation’s social and institutional objectives
on an annual basis. Affirming the fundamental role
of headquarters to facilitate branch and, in turn,
client success, each member of the headquarters
team is rewarded based on the performance of the
branch network overall; if those in the field
succeed, headquarters is rewarded.15 Figure 1
summarises eligibility at each level and the six core
performance areas on which the bonus is based.
Among other benefits, this new system has
contained personnel costs by tying them more
closely to Prizma’s financial health; increased the
regularity, consistency, and relevancy of formal
performance appraisal (now every trimester);
clarified what good performance is for every
position at every level; balanced reward for
individual and team performance; balanced short-
and medium-term performance; and helped
maintain focus on sustaining social performance.
4. Measuring social performance
4.1 Assessing poverty and monitoring
impact
Internal and external research and other
organisational learning have moved Prizma along a
continuum of three critical objectives: determining
the relative and absolute poverty level of its clients;
strengthening targeting of and service to poor and
very poor clients; and measuring change in the
lives of these people over time. Working closely
with the MFC and members of the ‘Microfinance
for the Very Poor’ working group under Imp-Act,
Prizma has used data from the UNDP’s Early
Warning System, a recent LSMS, the CGAP poverty
assessment and omnibus survey, focus group
research with clients, and input from staff, to
identify robust (non-economic) proxy indicators to
assess clients’ poverty status and monitor impact
over time.
Developed as a scorecard, this system serves two
critical purposes. First, it enables Prizma to report
on the poverty level of every client in absolute
terms in relation to the national poverty line and
the international ‘$1 a day’ measures. This new
capacity to gauge the poverty status of clients in a
fairly clear and cost-effective manner is based on
robust and meaningful indicators rather than on
average outstanding balance as a percentage of
gross national product per capita – an easy but
wholly inadequate means of gauging depth of
outreach in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Second, it
enables the organisation to measure discrete
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change in clients’ well-being over time, to indicate
to internal and external stakeholders the extent to
which the organisation is improving clients’ and
their families’ well-being. While this system does
not, on its own, capture the complex, dynamic,
multi-dimensional, and context-specific nature of
poverty in Bosnia and Herzegovina, it does enable
Prizma to understand and demonstrate more
clearly and on a regular basis the extent to which it
is (a) reaching who it seeks (and claims) to be
reaching, and (b) fulfilling its social mission.
5. Conclusion
This article has outlined the primary ways in which
Prizma has set out to enhance and sustain social
performance, by building capacity for and
undertaking ongoing research, leveraging
leadership, shaping organisational culture, crafting
appropriate incentives, and developing systems to
assess poverty status and monitor impact. Through
this process Prizma has learned or affirmed a
number of important lessons:
n People’s poverty status does not determine if
they are able to access microfinance services,
whereas good institutional design, in the form
of leadership, structure, culture, incentives,
can answer some of these questions.
n Organisations committed to effective and
sustained poverty outreach and positive impact
must maintain absolute focus and clarity of
purpose.
n Organisations committed to serving large
numbers of poor and very poor people must be
ruthless about efficiency and transparent about
performance.
n Sustained service that leads to positive impact
requires understanding and differentiating
between poor people’s developmental needs
and market wants. This understanding, in turn,
will allow organisations to sustain social
performance by effectively balancing
developmental and institutional imperatives.
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Notes
1. The SEEP Network is a network of US-based
organisations engaged directly or indirectly in
microfinance. 
2. It is widely recognised that direct measures are more
prone to bias – respondents’ overstatement,
understatement, or withholding of information
based on their perception that such action will serve
their interests vis-à-vis the microfinance.
3. The International Catholic Migration Commission
(ICMC). Though primarily focused on non-
microfinance interventions to assist and support
refugees or those in refugee-like settings, ICMC has
leveraged donor funds to develop and fully localise
three MFOs in the Balkans – DEMOS, a Croatian
savings and loan cooperative, the Kosovo Enterprise
Program (KEP), and Prizma in Bosnia and
Herzegovina.
4. For more information on Prizma see www.prizma.ba
5. See www.microsave-africa.com for more details.
6. CGAP is a consortium of 29 bilateral and multilateral
donor agencies which support microfinance. CGAP
serves microfinance institutions, donors and the
microfinance industry through the development of
technical tools and services, the delivery of training,
strategic advice and technical assistance, and action
research on innovations.
7. Though findings suggest that Prizma is reaching its
mission-defined target group in general, because the
CGAP poverty assessment is a relative measure, it is
not a definitive statement on poverty outreach.
8. Emphasising this point, Milanovic (1998) finds that
per capita income Gini coefficient of the Country is
0.45 – among the highest of all transitioning
countries – compared to a pre-war coefficient of 0.26.
9. One of the clearest opportunities for Prizma has been
the fact that most of its peers have begun moving up
market. Thus, for both developmental and
competitive reasons, Prizma has continued its move
to serve a larger number of poorer people,
particularly in rural areas.
10. Between 0.5 per cent and 1 per cent portfolio at risk
1–180 days.
11. In addition to strengthening products and service
generally, Prizma Management monitors cross-
selling between products and involuntary drop-out,
which offer opportunities to improve client
retention.
12. In 2002, Prizma began using activity-based costing
(ABC) to calculate product and other costs of its
operations. In 2003, the organisation plans to pursue
credit scoring to manage risk, improve efficiency,
and further deepen outreach.
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13. PAR 31–180 days, loans disbursed, client caseload
(per product), and drop-out. Additionally, depth is
monitored and rewarded non-financially.
14. Performance is measured against historic
benchmarks rather than targets set by branch teams
themselves, to mitigate the risk of ‘gaming’ – over or
under targeting – that can result when teams or
individuals are rewarded for performance towards
targets they have been tasked with setting.
15. Prizma’s external auditor confirms performance
results at the end of the year to ensure transparency
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